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Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation
ABSTRACT
This paper surveys recent developments in the literature on efficiency wage
theories of unemployment.Efficiency wage models have in common the property
that in equilibrium firms may find it profitable to pay wages in excess of
market clearing.High wages can help reduce turnover, elicit worker effort,
prevent worker collective action, and attract higher quality employees. Simple
versions of efficiency wage models can explain normal involuntary unemployment,
segmented labor markets, and wage differentials across firms and industries for
workers with similar productive characteristics. Deferred payment schemes and
other labor market bonding mechanisms appear to be able to solve some efficiency
wage problems without resultant job rationing and involuntary unemployment.A
wide variety of evidence on inter—industry wage differences is analyzed.Ef-
ficiency wage models appear useful in explaining the observed pattern of wage
differentials.The models also provide several potential mechanisms for cy-
clical fluctuations in response to aggregate demand shocks.
Lawrence Katz




The question of why unemployed workers are unable to bid down the wages of seem-
ingly comparable employed workers and gain jobs has long perplexed economists.
A burgeoning literature, the efficiency wage literature, suggests that the answer
to this puzzle may lie in the negative incentive effects of low wages. The basic
efficiency wage hypothesis states that workers' productivities depend positively
on their wages. If this is the case, firms may find it profitable to pay wages
in excess of market clearing. This is possible because the wage that minimizes
a firm's labor costs per efficiency unit of labor may not be the wage that clears
the labor market.Employers may be quite reluctant to cut wages, even in the
presence of an excess supply of labor, since reducing wages may actuallylower
productivity more than proportionately and actually increase labor costs. Equi-
librium can therefore be consistent with persistent involuntary unemployment in
some versions of thesemodels.1
A variety of conceptually distinct, although potentially complimentary, explana-
tions for the direct relationship between wages and productivity have been ana-
lyzed in the literature.These approaches are based on the potential benefits
to the firm of higher wages: increased effort level and reduced shirking by em-
ployees; lower turnover costs; a higher quality labor force; and improved morale,
more easily facilitated teamwork, and greater feelings of loyalty by workers to
the firm.These economic gains to an employer of high—wage policies have long
been stressed by institutional labor economists (Dunlop (1985) and Reynolds (1978,
chapter 9)).
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 2Alternative rationales for the payment of non—competitivewage premiums relate
to the presence of unions or threat of collective action by workers. Firmsmay
find it profitable to pay greater than competitivewages to unionized workers to
2 . maintainindustrial peace.Industrial relations and human resource specialists
and institutional economists have long argued that nonunion firms oftenpay higher
wages than necessary to attract qualified labor for the purpose of avoiding
unionization.3 Dickens (1986)develops a model of the impact of the threat of
collective action by workers on wages and employment which closely resembles ef-
ficiency wage models.
Efficiency wage models have been advanced in recent literature as providinga
coherent explanation of normal unemployment. Some authors haveeven argued that
these theories provide solid microfoundatioms for Keynesianpropositions con-
cerning the importance of wage rigidity and the existence of cyclically—varying
levels of involuntary unemployment.4 Efficiencywage considerations also provide
a potential explanation for large and persistent "non—competitive"wage differ-
entials across firms and industries for workers with similar productive charac-
teristics. Rulow and Summers (1986) argue that wage differentialsarising from
efficiency wage reasons may provide a justification for trade arfd industrial
policies designed to protect and subsidize sectors with high wage jobs.
In this paper, I survey recent developments in the efficiencywage literature and
discuss theoretical and practical shortcomings of the models.5 I reviewa wide
variety of empirical evidence on wage patterns and cyclical properties of labor
markets. The consistency of the models with this evidence helps providea partial
evaluation of the usefulness of the efficiency wage approach.
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wage model and discusses some of the basic implications of the efficiency wage
hypothesis. Alternative models with efficiency wage structures, their empirical
predictions, and theoretical shortcomings are analyzed in section 3. Efficiency
wage models in which firms are assumed to only be able to utilize simple wage
schemes as compensation mechanisms are shown to be capable of generating a number
of important labor market phenomena including involuntary unemployment, dual
(segmented) labor markets, and wage distributions for workers with identical
productive characteristics. The same problems, such as the inability of firms
to monitor worker performance costlessly and costly turnover, that give rise to
efficiency wage payments above the market clearing level create incentives for
the use of alternative incentive devices and the development of internal labor
markets and long—term contractual relationships in the labor market. Alternative
forms of labor contracts, typically involving the (implicit) posting of perform-
ance bonds, can eliminate the job rationing that arises in versions of the models
in which firms are limited to the use of simple wage policies. Practical problems
arising from capital market imperfections and moral hazard problems on the part
of firms may limit the potential for alternative compensation arrangements to
eliminate efficiency wage problems.
A wide variety of evidence on inter—industry wage differences is analyzed in
section 4. Efficiency wage models make strong predictions concerning the exist-
ence of wage differentials arising from differences across industries in the
wage—productivity relationship.Important systematic wage differentials across
industries are present that do not appear to be easily explained by the standard
competitive rationales of differences in labor quality, compensating differen-
tials, or transitory disturbances. Although no single efficiency wage model seems
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plaining the observed pattern of wage differentials. The consistency of effi-
ciency wage theories with evidence on the cyclical behavior of labor markets and
on labor market discrimination is also discussed in section 4.
Section 5 discusses the mechanisms through which efficiency wage models may help
explain wage rigidity and cyclical fluctuations. The models explain why firms
may not lose much if they fail to adjust wages to shocks. The addition of small
costs of changing prices and wages, as emphasized by Mankiw (1985) and Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1985), or of near—rational inertial behavior, as analyzed by Akerlof
and Yellen (1985a,b), to efficiency wage models leads to a potential model of
cyclical fluctuations in response to aggregate demand movements.
Concluding remarks concerning the usefulness of the efficiency wage approach are
presented in section 6.
2. The Basic Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
Some of the primary implications of efficiency wage models can be illuminated in
a simple model in which a worker's physical health and therefore productivity is
assumed to depend positively on the real wage paid. This formulation was advanced
by Leibenstein (1957) to highlight the linkages among wages, nutrition, and health
in less developed countries.Firms, in this context, get healthier, more pro-
ductive workers if they pay higher wages.Solow (1979) formulates a formally
similar model for developed economies in which increased wages improve morale and
this directly affects productivity through an increase in worker effort.
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itive firms, each possessing a short—run production function of the form Q=
aF(e(w)L)where e is the effort (or efficiency) level of a worker, L is the number
of employees, w is the real wage, a is a productivity shifter, and Q is output.
The price of output is taken to be the numeraire. All workers are assumed to have
identical wage—productivity relationships of the form e(w) with e'>O, e(O)￿O, and
the elasticity of e(w) with respect to w declining in
A profit—maximizing firm, able to hire all the labor it wants at the wage it
chooses to offer, solves the following problem
(1) max aF(e(w)L)-wL
w, L




The optimal wage w* satisfies the condition that the elasticity of effort with
respect to the wage is unity. The wage w* is known as the efficiency wagesince
it minimizes wage costs per efficiency unit of labor.Each firm hires labor up
to the point where its marginal product equals w*.
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 6If the aggregate demand for labor falls short of theaggregate labor supply at
w*, equilibrium will entail involuntary unemployment.Unemployed workers will
strictly prefer to work at w* rather than be unemployed, but firms will haveno
incentive to hire them at that wage or to lower wages. This simple version of
the efficiency wage hypothesis can explain equilibrium involuntaryunemployment.
Real wage rigidity also arises in this model.Changes in relative price to the
firm or productivity shocks (shifts in a) do not affect the efficiencywage w*,
7 but lead to alterations in the level of employment.
The simple efficiency wage model can be easily extended to provide potentialra-
tionales for wage differentials among workers with identical characteristics and
the existence of dual labor markets.If the linkages between wages and effort
differ across firms, then the optimal wage will differ across firms anda dis-
tribution of wages for workers with identical characteristics can arise inequi-
librium. These wage differentials are not compensating differences for
nonpecuniary aspects of work that directly affect workers' welfare.Dual labor
markets of the type described by Doe.ringer and Piore (1971) can also arise if the
wage—productivity relationship is more important in some sectors than in others.
High wages and job rationing can arise in the sector where efficiency wage con-
siderations are salient, while the secondary sector, where efficiencywage con-
siderations are less important, acts as a competitive labor market.
The alternative efficiency wage models examined in the next section providemore
explicit microeconomic foundations for the wage—productivity relationship in de-
veloped economies. A direct derivation of the wage—productivity relationship from
assumptions concerning tastes, technology, and information structure is necessary
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 7to analyze the welfare implications of unemployment and labor market segmentation
in these models.
3. Variations on the Efficiency Wage Theme
3.1. The Shirking Model
3.1.1. The Basic Approach and Implications
Employers typically have only imperfect information concerning the behavior of
workers on the job. The supervision and monitoring of worker actions is costly.
The punishments for substandard employee performance available to a firm are
typically limited by legal constraints and social custom.Firms can suspend,
demote, or fire an employee for inadequate performance or misbehavior, but
imprisonment, physical torture, direct cash fines, or resort to tort or contract
law for redress are simply not available options for many forms of worker
malfeasance.
Under these conditions, employers must find mechanisms to elicit adequate effort
from their employees.Piece rates and other direct pay—for—performance compen-
sation schemes are often expensive to operate or impracticable since it may be
difficult to observe an individual employee's contributions.8 Firms may find it
profitable in this situation to raise wages above the opportunity costs of work-
ers. By increasing wages, firms raise the cost of job loss and encourage workers
to put forth adequate effort. When workers are paid wages above their opportunity
costs, they value their jobs, and the threat of termination for detected loafing
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 8creates an incentive for workers not to shirk.. Models in which the need of firms
to elicit effort from their workers can lead to the payment of wages in excess
of market clearing and generate equilibrium involuntary unemployment have re-
cently been examined by Bowles (1985), Bulow and Summers (1986), Calvo
(1979,1985), Calvo and Wellisz (1978), Eaton and White (1982, 1983), Foster and
Wan (1984), Gintis and Ishikawa (1983), Jones (1985), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
and Stoft (1982).
In the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) version of the model, firms can only
imperfectly monitor their workers' job performance, and workers make a discrete
choice of whether to work or shirk.Workers and firms are assumed to be
homogenous.If all firms pay the same market clearing wage, there is full em-
ployment and no cost to shirking since workers can immediately find another job
at the sane wage if fired.This strong result of no costs of shirking requires
no job switching or search costs and no adverse reputational effects on workers
in the labor market if they develop a poor employment history. The homogenous
workers assumption eliminates reputational effects on workers because all workers
are assumed to act the same given the same incentives. If effort is costly, all
Thus, it pays each firm workers shirk under these full employment conditions
to increase its wage to eliminate shirking. When all firms do this, the average
wage rises and employment is reduced. In equilibrium, all firms pay a wage above
the market clearing level creating unemployment. Since jobs are scarce and ra—
tioned, the loss of a job can involve a lengthy unemployment spell. The reserve
army of the unemployed acts as a worker discipline device making shirking costly.
Although some unemployment is optimal in this model since it plays a required role
in creating work incentives, Shapiro and Stiglitz show that the equilibrium un—
employment rate is not Pareto optimal.9 Equilibrium unemployment is involuntary
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 9in this model since identical workers are treated differently and since the un-
employed strictly prefer to be be employed.
The shirking model postulates a variety of factors that affect the firm's ability
to extract effort from workers and consequently yields some potentially testable
predictions concerning the nature of wage differentials and unemployment. Firms
should pay higher wages to a given quality worker where monitoring is costly
and/or difficult so that the probability of detecting shirking is low.Higher
wages may be required for positions in which poor employee performance can cause
a great deal of damage.In fact, the job evaluation systems used in the design
and maintenance of wage structures in many industries rate positions on a re-
sponsibility factor that is directly related to the probable damage that can be
caused by improper job performance (Milkovich and Newman, 1984). Workers in po-
sitions of trust and responsibility should receive wage premiums (Eaton and white,
1982). The value of a worker maintaining a job is reduced if the likelihood of
a future separation is great.This means firms with monitoring difficulties
should avoid hiring workers from observable groups believed to exhibit high
turnover and should attempt to maintain long—term employment relationships per-
haps through the use of worksharing or a layoff—recall process to deal with tem-
porary downturns. Increased variability in labor demand across sectors (greater
sectoral shift activity) directly increases unemployment through more separations
to facilitate labor reallocation and indirectly raises the structural unemploy-
ment rate by requiring firms to pay higher wages to prevent shirking since it
induces a greater likelihood of a future separation.1°
The expected income form unemployment affects the wage needed to induce proper
worker behavior. A higher unemployment insurance benefit raises the required wage
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 10and reduces employment.A higher unemployment rate and hence longer expected
duration of unemployment for a worker sacked for shirking reduces the needed wage.
Finally, the level of wages offered by other firms affect the prospects of a
discharged worker. The model suggests firms should be concerned with their po-
sition in the wage hierarchy (Bulow and Summers, 1986).
3.1.2. Segmented Labor Markets
The shirking model also provides a rationale for dual labor markets with a utility
differential for similar workers across the primary and secondary sectors and
rationing of primary sector jobs. The dual labor market hypothesis states that
the labor market can be roughly be divided into a primary sector that offers jobs
characterized by high wages and internal labor markets and a secondary sector that
offers low paying, menial jobs with little room for advancement (Doeringer and
Piore, 1971).
Dickens and Lang (1985a,b) find in two different micro data sets that the esti-
mation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two
distinct wage equations.The two equations closely resemble the predictions of
dual market theory for the characteristics of earnings functions in the primary
and secondary sectors. The equation to which most workers are associated yields
significant returns to experience and education. The other equation indicates
little or no returns from human capital variables. The estimation technique al-
lows the simultaneous determination of the probability of each worker's attachment
to each sector and each sector's earnings equation. The procedure allows a hy-
pothesis test that can be interpreted as a test of the rationing of primary sector
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 11jobs.Their results indicate the presence of some job rationing (particularly
for minority workers).
The basic objection to the dual labor market approach is based on the argument
that if secondary workers envy primary workers and are as productive, then primary
sector wages should be bid down to clear the market. One possibility is that wage
differences across the sectors reflect unmeasured worker quality differences.
Alternatively, the shirking model provides a coherent explanation for dual markets
with job rationing of "good" primary jobs even in an economy populated by
homogenous workers.
Bulow and Summers (1986) and Jones (1985) analyze versions of the shirking model
in which the detection of shirkers is difficult in one sector of the economy (the
primary sector) and monitoring is costless in the other sector (the secondary
sector). This roughly fits the empirical observation that the typical primary
job entails a fair degree of responsibility and independent action on the part
of the employee, while most secondary jobs involve assignments that are more
easily supervised.Efficiency wages above market clearing arise in the primary
sector creating a utility differential between primary and secondary jobs that
creates a cost to loss of a primary sector job."
Wait unemployment (such as in Hall, 1975) can be generated if it is easier to get
a primary sector job out of unemployment than out of the secondary sector and
workers queue up for primary sector jobs. This is likely if a history of secondary
sector employment is a bad signal to primary sector employers.Workers with
values of leisure greater than the secondary sector wage but lower than the pri-
mary sector wage may also enter unemployment to line up for primary sector va—
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 12cancies. Wage differentials arising from differences in monitoring difficulties
across firms create incentives for search unemployment.
Internal labor markets with internal promotion ladders are likely to arise in the
primary sector to maintain long—term employment relationships. The development
of internal labor markets and deferred payment schemes to induce effort in the
primary sector may obviate the need for the use of efficiency wages with
banishment to the secondary sector or unemployment as incentive devices. This
type of objection of alternative means to motivate workers is a basic difficulty
with the efficiency wage models.
3.1.3. Objections to the Shirking Model: The Bonding Critique
The predictions of the shirking model concerning job rationing and involuntary
unemployment arise from the dual economic functions performed by the wage. The
wage serves both to allocate labor and to provide incentives for adequate employee
performance (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The primary objection to the shirking
model is that firms have other methods to enforce employee discipline in a more
efficient manner than the use of a high wage plus threat of dismissal policy.
A variety of labor market bonding mechanisms can potentially eliminate the need
for unemployment as a worker discipline device. One direct method is for workers
to post performance bonds at the time of hiring that would be forfeited if they
were caught shirking.Alternatively, firms can pay efficiency wages but charge
workers an employment (or "entrance") fee (Becker and Stigler, 1974).If firms
utilize high wages to reduce incentives for workers to shirk or steal, unemployed
workers should be willing to pay entrance fees or post bonds to gain employment
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 13at these firms. The threat of forfeiting a bond or of paying a new employment
fee to gain employment can create work incentives and enable the market for jobs
to clear eliminating involuntary unemployment.
Instances of workers posting direct performance bonds or purchasing their jobs
are rare, although not entirely unknown.Employment arrangements that may im-
plicitly perform bonding functions such as upward sloping age—earnings profiles,
pensions and other deferred compensation schemes, and internal promotion ladders
are observed in a large segment (the primary sector) of the labor market. These
mechanisms appear in large establishments where monitoring problems are likely
to be important. Lazear (1979,1981) demonstrates that senioritywage systems in
which workers post a bond against cheating by accepting wages below their marginal
product initially and have it returned in the form of wages above the value of
their marginal product later in their careers and/or in the form of a pensionupon
retirement can solve the effort elicitation problem.
Practical objections arise to the use of complete bonding schemes in the labor
market. In the first place, workers, particularly early in their working lives,
face capital market constraints and lack the liquidity required topost large
bonds. If the probability of detecting shirking is low, the required bond or em-
ployment fee may be substantial.Carmichael (1985) argues that even if capital
markets are imperfect, firms can charge a fee sufficient to make the expected
utility of the job offer equal to the value of workers' reservation wages. Al-
though this may eliminate the directly involuntary nature of unemployment, it does
not lead to an efficient level of unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1985).
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 14Since outside party verification of detected shirking is difficult, firms have
an incentive to falsely claim that workers are shirking and claim the bonds. Firms
may collect employment fees and then dismiss workers. The firm's concern forits
reputation as an employer may be able to overcome this problem (Lazear; 1979,
1981). The difficulty of potential workers in verifying the honesty of a firm's
behavior means that the reputation mechanism is quite fragile and may be a far
from perfect enforcement mechanism (Kreps, 1984). The likelihood of firm default
on the bond can be reduced if the firm does not expect to gain from falsely
claiming that the worker is shirking.For example, if the firm claims that a
worker has shirked and discharges the worker, it is possible for the bond to be
paid to a third party instead of the firm. The worker is disciplined and the firm
does not gain from cheating. We do not see the direct use of third party systems
like this in practice.Carmichael (1983) argues that seniority promotion rules
with a fixed wage hierarchy can play this role. Additionally, tournament schemes
(Bhattacharya, 1983 and Malcoimson, 1984) may permit the firm to commit itself
to a wage plan that creates the proper incentives for workers.
Reputational considerations are likely to be important precisely for the large,
visible employers, such as IBM or General Motors, that provide high paying, pri-
mary sector jobs.These large firms offer exactly the type of jobs that the
shirking model indicates should pay efficiency wages and be rationed.Smaller,
less visible secondary firms which may not stay in business long are unlikely to
be able to get workers to trust that they will not renege on agreements concerning
deferred compensation. Thus, the implication of considering possible bonding
mechanisms and where they may be effective is that the secondary sector needs to
pay efficiency wages while the primary sector can utilize deferred paymentsand
pay market wages. This unrealistic prediction of the model suggests that further
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employers quite likely to value their reputations for keeping (implicit) promises
to their employees.
If capital markets were perfect and third party verification of shirking always
possible, firms would spend next to nothing on raising the probability of de-
tecting shirking and demand large bonds since monitoring is costly and the posting
of bonds would be costless under these circumstances (Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Dickens, Katz, and Lang, 1986).The empirical observation that firms devote
substantial resources to monitoring workers suggests that a full bonding solution
to the shirking problem is unattainable.' Thus, firms must be choosing one or
both of two second best alternatives to bonding: monitoring workers intensively
and/or paying efficiency wages.The likely outcome is that firms utilize bonds
to the extent possible, and then pick the optimal combination of efficiency wages
and monitoring required to prevent shirking in the presence of limited bonding
ability.
Lazear (1979) argues that the existence and observed pattern of mandatory re-
tirement provisions indicates that some bonding must be utilized in the labor
market. Adverse selection problems provide an alternative rationale for the use
of mandatory retirement policies. If individual performance is hard to observe,
wage cuts for older workers may lead to the better workers moving to other jobs
and the "lemons" remaining. Additionally, Medoff and Abraham (1980) provide ev-
idence that experience—earnings and tenure—earnings profiles cannot be fully ac-
counted for by rising productivity.The typical finding in cross—section wage
equation estimates of a positive effect of years of tenure at current job (sen-
iority) on earnings is often pointed to as evidence of these types of bonding
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These estimates merely show that workers who have been on a given job for a longer
period of time earn higher wages. This nay reflect returns to seniority beyond
those to general labor market experience as in the bonding stories, or it may
reflect that workers in good jobs or good matches earn higher wages throughout
their job tenure and are less likely to quit these valuable jobs. (Abraham and
Farber, 1986;Altonji and Shakotko, 1985).Alternatively, better workers may
earn more throughout their careers and have greater job tenure in any given
cross—section since they may tend to be more stable. Nevertheless, pensions may
be the primary labor force bonding mechanisms. Ippolito (1985) presents a variety
of evidence indicating the importance of bonding through pensions.
Practical limitations on the use of alternative incentive mechanisms suggest that
high wages and involuntary unemployment may be a profitable discipline device.
The limitations on bonding devices appear least important in exactly the type of
jobs the model predicts should pay efficiency wages (jobs in large, primary sector
firms).
3.2. The Labor Turnover Model
Workers are likely to be more reluctant to quit a job the higher the (relative)
wage paid by the current firm and the worse the prospects in the external labor
market (e.g. the higher the aggregate unemployment rate). If firms must bear part
of the costs of turnover and if quit rates are a decreasing function of wages paid,
firms have an incentive to pay high wages to reduce costly labor turnover. Salop
(1979) and Stiglitz (1974, 1985) formally analyze models based on these features.
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shirking model. Firms' attempts to pay high relative wages to minimize turnover
costs can lead to an equilibrium with wages in excess of market clearing and in-
voluntary unemployment serving to reduce quit rates.
The market failure in this model arises, as in the shirking model, because of the
dual role played by the wage. The same wage is unable to simultaneously clear
the market for new hires and the market for trained workers (Salop,1979). A
seniority wage system in which new workers accept initial lower wages below their
marginal products to pay for their training and hiring costs can solve the problem
and eliminate involuntary unemployment.If training and hiring costs are large
and are concentrated in a short initial period, employment or application fees
need to be levied on new workers. Firms do not have an incentive to induce workers
to quit if training must actually be provided or hiring costs entailed.Thus,
the moral hazard problem on the firms side is not as serious as in the shirking
model Capital market imperfections may make the payment of large fees imprac-
tical .Salop(1979) and Stiglitz (1984) point out that risk averse workers are
unlikely to be willing to post bonds and bear the risk that they are unsuited to
a job. These considerations indicate that it is realistic to assume that firms
must bear part of the costs of turnover.
The model predicts that high wages will be found where hiring and training costs
are formidable.These wage premiums should •be associated with lower turnover
rates.Stiglitz (1985) shows that the model provides an explanation for wage
distributions within an industry for similar workers.Equally profitable high
wage—low turnover and low wage—high turnover strategies can coexist for identical
firms and workers for certain types of quit functions.13
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Imperfect. information by firms about the abilities of workers may provide a se-
lection rationale for efficiency wage payments. If workers are heterogeneous in
ability and if ability and reservation wages are positively correlated, firms
which offer higher wages will attract higher quality job applicants.If firms
cannot observe applicant quality and lack devices to induce workers to reveal
their true abilities, random hiring from the applicant pool must be utilized. A
higher wage increases the expected ability of a worker hired randomly from the
applicant pool. A wage above the market clearing level may minimize costs per
efficiency unit of labor under these circumstances (Stiglitz, 1976; and Weiss,
1980).Institutional, legal, or sociological constraints preventing firms from
differentiating wages across workers with different productive characteristics
can lead to similar results.'4
A basic objection to the model is that firms are likely to eventually learn a
worker's ability. In this case, performance bonds can solve the adverse selection
problem. The same moral hazard problem on the part of firms and capital market
imperfections that limit the use of bonding for shirking problems apply in this
context as well. If firms can measure performance on the job, pay—for—performance
schemes eliminate the problem. Employment contracts with self—selection incen-
tives (nonlinear wage— employment contracts) can also potentially ease adverse
selection problems (Mookherjee, 1984a).
3.4. Sociological Models
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 19Workers effort levels may significantly depend on the extent to which they feel
they are being treated fairly by their employers. The perceived justness of the
wage may affect worker productivity if effort leVels are linked to worker morale
and feelings of loyalty to the firm.'5 Akerlof (1982,1984) and Solow (1979) argue
that wage rigidity in the face of unemployment may be due to the importance of
social wage norms and other behaviors not well—captured by traditional
individualistic utility functions. Akerlof (1984) discusses a variety of evidence
from sociological studies indicating that a worker's effort level depends on the
norms of his or her work group (peer pressure) and posits a number of
sociologically based models with efficiency wage implications. Akerlof (1982)
develops a model in which firms can raise group work norms by offering wages above
the level necessary to attract a labor force. The firms "gift" of high wages is
rewarded by the "gift" of improved work norms and increased individual effort.
Wages in excess of market clearing may be the outcome when wages play a dual role
of both allocating labor across firms and of satisfying interpersonal and
intertemporal wage norms that matter for worker performance.
Most firms pay careful attention to the perceived fairness and consistency of
their internal wage structures. Doeringer and Piore (1971) find that firms devote
far more resources to and place more weight in their wage policies on job evalu-
ation programs designed to maintain and br justify their internal wage structures
than to market wage surveys utilized to keep wages in line with those of product
or labor market competitors. Richard Wing (1984, p. 9/18), a former compensation
director at Eastman Kodak, notes
There is always some degree of conflict between internal and external pay equity.
The position taken by most salary administrators is that internal relationships
should be given first priority, and external pay relationships for certain jobs
must be compromised on occasion.
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 20If certain wage relationships matter to a firms workforce, it is in the firm's
interest to take those considerations into account.
The sociological models indicate that efficiency wages are likely to arise where
work groups and teamwork are important. These models may also explain the direct
impact of product market factors and the firm's "ability—to—pay" on wages. Worker
morale and loyalty and consequently productivity may depend on the extent that
the firm shares its rents with its employees.
3.5. The Union Threat Model
Firms are likely to face important diseconornies of scale in the hiring and
training of workers.If there are costs to job search and/or relocation, a firm
may have to increase its wage offer or reduce the quality of accepted applicants
to replace a large number of workers quickly.If one or a few workers leaves a
firm, their co—workers are likely to have overlapping firm— and job—specific
knowledge and to be able to train replacements. When many workers quit in a short
time period, more valuable knowledge is lost per worker and no one may be left
capable of training replacement employees. Since the costs of turnover to the
firm rise rapidly as the number of workers needed to be replaced in a given in-
terval increases, collective action can provide workers with more bargaining power
than they have acting individually.Social norms such as the willingness of
customers and suppliers to boycott a struck firm, may in many settings prevent
firms from doing business even if they can replace workers who attempt to act
collectively.Collective action by workers may enable them to shut a business
down.This bargaining power can potentially be used by workers to claim for
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short run) a share of the returns on the fixed assets.
Dickens (1986) analyzes the effect of the threat of collective action by workers
on wages and employment on firms that attempt to avoid collective bargaining with
their employees (i.e. attempt to keep out a union). A firm can avoid unionization
in the model by choosing wages and employment so that no coalition greater than
or equal to a fixed fraction of the workforce (a majority in U.S. labor law) can
be formed around a feasible union contract. The organization of a union is as-
sumed (realistically) to be costly to the workforce. A firm can prevent collec-
tive action by paying its workers a wage as high as they would receive under a
collective bargaining agreement minus the cost to the workers of organizing.
Foulkes (1980) provides many examples of nonunion firms that try to keep wages
close to the union wage level for comparable jobs. Dickens shows that the threat
of collective action can explain why unemployed workers cannot bid down a firm's
wages.'6 Unemployed workers who are hired and paid a lower wage will attempt to
organize collectively. Firms may find it profitable to pay wages above the market
clearing level to try to prevent unionization.Thus, the model can lead to job
rationing and unemployment in a manner similar to efficiency wage models. The
evidence presented by Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) that union organization drives
reduce a firm's stock price and by Freeman (1983) that unions are associated with
lower profitability provides a strong rationale for firms to develop labor re-
lations policies that help maintain a nonunion environment.
•Firms may be able to avoid unionization in other manners rather than paying high
wages. One possibility is the posting of bonds that are forfeited if a worker is
involved in union activity.Jacoby (1983) notes that some firms in the late
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 22nineteenth century withheld some of workers earnings. These withheld earnings were
forfeited if workers went out on strike. If a union is formed, it might be able
to extract the return of the bonds.Firms could also require workers to sign
contracts barring them from engaging in collective action as a condition of em-
ployment. 'Yellow dog" contracts of this type are not enforceable in the con-
temporary United States.
The union threat model predicts that wage premiums should arise where the costs
of organization are low for workers and where the potential gains from
unionization are high.Product market power (large monopoly rents per worker)
and high capital/labor ratios increase the potential gains from collective action
and should be associated with higher union wages and higher wages of nonunion
workers with a credible threat to organize. Dickens (1986) provides a number of
arguments within the framework of the model for the stability of real and/or
nominal wages over the business cycle.International differences in labor law
and the potential threat of unionization provide important identifying informa-
tion for the possible importance of collective action threats as a cause of un-
employment and wage rigidity,
3.6. Brief Summary
There are a variety of plausible explanations why firms may find it in their in-
terest to pay wages in excess of narket clearing. The mechanisms underlying these
alternative efficiency wage theories are summarized in Table 1.These models
appear capable of explaining persistent involuntary unemployment, segmented labor
markets, and wage differentials for similar workers that are not equalizing dif-
ferences.The use of deferred payment schemes and internal promotion ladders










worker effort level and
performance; monitoring
is costly
Firms must bear part of
turnover costs


















Sociological Morale and worker feelings
of loyalty to firm depend




loyalty to firms which
raise productivity











outsidewithin long—term employment relationships may be able to solvesome efficiency
wage problems without the resort to job rationing.The empirical relevance of
efficiency wage theories is examined in more detail in the next section.
4. Some Empirical Evidence Relating to Usefulness f the Approach
4.1. Inter—industry Wage Differences
4.1.1. Some Implications of Efficiency Wage Models for Wage Differentials
It has long been noted that there are large differences inwages across industries
for apparently similar work. Substantial industrywage differentials remain even
after controlling for union status and observed worker and Job characteristics
(Bloch and Kuskin, 1978; Dickens and Katz, 1986 ; Krueger and Summers, 1986; and
many others).In fact, large wage differences for essentially the sametype of
work in the same locality have invariably been uncovered by areawage surveys.
Slichter (1950) observes that hiring rates paid for common labor by 85plants in
Cleveland in February 1947 ranged from $.50 to $1.09 an hour. Re notes that this
spread persisted despite the fact that rates had been compiled and distributed
to firms throughout the city by the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce forover twenty
years. John Dunlop (1985; p. 18) summarizes the typical finding of studies of
local wage variation:
It is a well established fact that wage rates oraverage hourly earnings for a
defined job classification, such as maintenance electricianor key punch operator,
show very wide variation in a locality, particularly in acommunity with a variety
of industries. The top wage rates for the same job classificationare often two
or three times the low ones. Differences in fringe benefit programs enlarge these
differences.
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 24These wage differentials provide an empirical challenge to alternative labor
market models. The ability of competitive and efficiency wage models of the labor
market to meet this challenge is the focus, of this section which draws heavily
upon the review and analysis presented in Dickens and Katz (1986).
A standard competitive labor market model implies that persistent industry wage
premiums require industry—related differences in labor quality (skill) and/or
non—wage dimensions of work requiring equalizing differences. Reder (1962, p.
276) summarizes these predictions:
In the long run, under competitive conditions, any industry will pay the same
price for a given grade of labor as any other industry hiring in the same location.
This remark must be qualified for differences in nonpecuniary attractions of
different industries and locations .. .Therefore,in the long run, the real wage
differentials among industries will reflect differences in the skill mix.
Alternatively, industry wage differences at any given point of time for similar
work may reflect transitory differentials related to shifts in labor demand across
sectors and imperfect short—run labor mobility.
On the other hand, a basic implication of efficiency wage models is that if the
conditions necessitating efficiency wage payments differ across industries, then
the optimal wage will differ among industries.This means that workers with
identical productive characteristics are paid differently depending on their in-
dustry affiliation. These wage differences for similar workers reflect industry
characteristics that do not directly affect the utility of workers and thus do
not require compensating differentials.Intra—industry wage distributions for
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 25similar workers may arise from differences in the wage—productivity relationship
across firms in an industry.
Each variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis potentially predicts that partic-
ular industry and firm characteristics should be associated with industry wage
premiums. The shirking model leads to the prediction that wages should be high
ft.
wheremonitoring costs are large. High wages are likely to be substituted for
intensive monitoring activities in these circumstances. Wage differentials may
also be required where the costs of worker malfeasance are high. Oi (1983) sug-
gests that higher wages are required in large establishments since monitoring is
typically more difficult. The cost of foul ups is likely to be large in industries
with expensive equipment (possibly proxied by high capital/labor ratios) and for
workers in positions where poor performance may affect many other workers per-
formances (e.g. workers in coordinating positions and workers involved integrated
production processes.)
The turnover model implies that wage premiums should arise where turnover and
training costs are large and that wage premiums should yield the benefit of lower
quit rates. The adverse selection model predicts higher wages, after controlling
for observables, where it is difficult to evaluate labor quality. The sociolog-
ical (or normative) models are less specific but suggest that the importance of
teamwork and ability—to—pay may be relevant.The importance of relative wage
comparisoms in some sociological models provides a rationale for long—term sta-
bility of wage differentials and and for linkages in the wage differentials across
occupations within a firm or industry. Finally, the union threat model suggests
that wage premiums arise where the costs of unionization are low to workers and
where the firm has rents derived from market power or has large fixed capital
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. 26investments. This means that product market power should directly be reflected
in wages. Differences in industry wage premiums across occupations with important
union threats (blue collar occupations) and those with smaller threats or no
possibility of unionization (managers and professional workers) provides further
information on the importance of union—based models.
The primary point is that efficiency wage models predict that there should be
important wage differentials not explained by compensating differentials, labor
quality differences, or shifts in labor demand across sectors. An important ap-
proach to the assessment of the empirical relevance of wage models involves the
determination of the importance of non—competitive wage differences.Further
relevant information can be gained by examining the nature of these wage premiums
for consistency with the predictions of individual efficiency wage alternatives.
Some initial evidence on the nature and importance of industry wage differentials
is provided through cross—section estimates of industry effects utilizing indi-
vidual level data.Table 2 presents estimated wage differentials for broadly
defined industries based on the results of a regression of log hourly earnings
on industry dummies with human capital, demographic and locational controls for
a large sample of private sector workers from the combined 1983 Current Population
Survey(CPS).17 The employment—weighted average of the coefficients of the indus-
try dummy variables from the regression was calculated with the omitted industry
dummy treated as having a zero effect on wages.18 The estimated differentials
presented in Table 2 are the differences between the actual industry coefficients
and the weighted average. These differentials indicate the proportional differ-
ence in wages between an employee in a given industry and the average employee
in the sample after controlling for individual characteristics, SMSA status, and
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Table 2: Estimated OLS Log Wage Differentials for
One—Digit Industries and Union Status

























Controls included are education (years of schooling) and its square; experience
(age—education—5) and its square; married; sex; race; part—time work; SMSA;
interaction terms for both experience and its square with married, race,sex,
education, part—time work and SMSA; 11 occupation dummies; and 50 state dummies.
Tablesstate of residence. The industry variables have a sizeable impact on wages. For
example, workers in mining and transportation and public utilities earn approxi-
mately 45 and 32 percent more than observationally equivalent workers in retail
trade.The industry wage effects are comparable in magnitude to the effect of
union status.
Krueger and Summers (1986) provide evidence on industry wage differentials for a
more disaggregated industry breakdown. They report industry wage premiums that
range from 38 percent above the average industry for the petroleum industry to
37 percent below the average for private household workers in estimates from the
1984 May Current Population Survey that include a wide variety of controls for
individual characteristics, union status, and occupation.Kreuger and Summers
find the employment—weighted standard deviation of industry wage premiums for two
digit industries to range from 10 to 15 percent for different years of the CPS
from 1974 to 1984.
Dickens and Katz (1986) find that the industry wage differentials persist when
union and nonunion workers are analyzed separately. The patterns of industry wage
premiums are extremely similar for union and nonunion employees. The raw corre-
lation of three digit industry wage premiums for union and nonunion workers in
the combined 1983 CPS sample is .65.19
4.1.2. Competitive Explanations for Wage Differentials
A number of explanations consistent with standard competitive labor market models
are possible for the large impact of industry affiliation on wages even after
controlling for measured human capital variables. The first posits that differ—
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workers (and hence pay higher wages) in some industries. Estimated industry wage
premiums in a cross—section may primarily reflect individual—specific components
of earnings capacity that are unobservable (to the econometrician) and correlated
with industry status.If unmeasured ability is highly correlated with observed
labor quality variables, such as years of schooling and labor market experience,
then unmeasured labor quality cannot provide an explanation for the large esti-
mated industry wage effects,Dickens and Katz (1986) show that the size of in-
dustry wage effects is not much altered if wage equations are first estimated
without industry variables and then the residuals are used to determine the in-
dustry impacts. This approach credits observed quality variables with the impacts
of unobserved variables correlated with both measured quality variables and in-
dustry status.
Longitudinal data provides a potential vehicle to control for time invariant,
unmeasured labor quality.If high wage industries simply have workers of high
unobserved ability and if workers of a given quality are paid equally in different
industries, wage changes should not systematically be limked to changes in in-
dustry status. Longitudinal data allow one to examine the wages of a given in-
dividual as he or she switches industries.First difference (or fixed—effects)
estimation allows one to eliminate the impacts of unchanging unobserved ability
components (that are rewarded equally in all industries) on the industry wage
effects estimates. Krueger and Summers (1986) estimate large effects of industry
switches (for broadly defined industries) on wages in first differenced re-
gressions utilizing a pooled sample of matched May CPS data for 1974—75, 1977—78,
and 1979—80. The estimated industry effects from the first differenced regression
are similar in direction and magnitude to pooled regression estimates.Thus,
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 29workers moving from high to low wage industries appear to experiencewage declines
and workers moving from low to high wage industriesappear to experience wage
gains.20 Vroman (1978) reports similar results forindustry switchers in the
1964—1971 period utilizing social security continuouswage history data on indi-
viduals' annual earnings. Murphy and Topel (1986) find in matched CPS data for
the 1977 to 1984 period that industry switchers receive only 30percent of the
wage gains that would have been predicted from the industry differentials observed
in cross—sectional data. The Murphy and Topel results are likely to be downward
biased estimates of the industry premiums since their measure of thewage in the
post—switch job is derived form annual earnings data that combines earnings from
both the pre— and post—switch jobs. The existing longitudinal evidencesuggests
that at least a moderate portion of the industry differentials found incross—
sectional analyses reflect "true" differentials rather than just unmeasured
ability.
A second possible competitive explanation is that the industrywage differentials
are compensating differentials for nonwage job attributes that directly affect
the utility of workers.21 In fact, this is often the justification for the
inclusion of industry dummies in estimated wage equations with individualcross—
section data. Krueger and Summers (1986) find that the inclusion of 10 working
conditions variables in a standard wage equation barely affects the estimated
industry wage premiums.22 Many important nonpecuniary job attributes are unlikely
to be captured by their control variables. Freeman (1981) and Krueger and Summers
find that the fringe benefit differentials tend to expandwage differences.
Murphy and Topel (1986) find that differences in unemployment risk across indus-
tries can account for only a quite small fraction of industrywage differentials.
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 30If industry wage premiums reflect equalizing differences, then they do not reflect
rents that make jobs especially valuable to workers. The implication is that the
wage premiums should not be systematically related to quit rates. Industryand
individual level studies both indicate that wage premiums are strongly associated
with lower quit rates (Pencavel ,1970;Freeman, 1980; and Krueger and Summers,
1986).This suggests that industry wage premiums reflect rents to good jobs or
good matches and are not merely compensatingdifferences.23
An additional competitive explanation for industry wage premiums observed at any
point of time is that they largely reflect transitory differentials created by
shifts in labor demand across sectors and maintained by incomplete labor mobility
in the short run.The strong stability of industry differentials over time ap-
pears to rule out transitory factors as a major component of the explanation.
Cullen (1956) presents data showing remarkable stability in the industry wage
structure in the United States from 1899 to 1950. He finds the rank correlation
of average annual earnings for 76 manufacturing industries for the years 1899 and
1950 to be .66. Cullen finds for a group of 84 manufacturing industries that 14
of the 21 industries in the highest—wage quarter in 1899 were still in the
highest—wage quarter in 1947. Also, 15 of the 21 lowest wage industries in 1899
remained in the lowest—wage quarter in 1947. Cullen furthermore provides evidence
of stability in the extent of wage dispersion over the long—term. The degree of
dispersion across industries is approximately the same in 1950 as in 1899.
This long—term stability in industry average wages may reflect stability in skill
mix differences. Industry differentials for any given grade of labor could reflect
responses to sectoral labor demand and/or supply shifts.Limited evidence
available from this time period suggest that industry wage differences for par—
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 31ticular grades of labor were fairly stable. Slichter (1950) finds the rank cor-
relation of males unskilled average hourly earnings for 20 manufacturing
industries between 1923 and 1946 to be•7324
Strong stability in inter—industry wage rankings is also evident for the postwar
United States.Montgomery and Stockton (1985) report that the rank correlation
of mean hourly wages for 20 2—digit manufacturing industries between 1951 and 1981
was .675. Bell and Freeman (1985) find strong stability in the rankings for a
group of 53 industries (both manufacturing and non—manufacturing)from 1948 to
1982. Both Bell and Freeman and Montgomery and Stockton note that the dispersion
(log standard deviation) of industry mean wages increased substantially during
the 1970's. On the other hand, Krueger and Summers (1986) find that the estimated
two digit wage premiums using individual data from the CPS and controlling for
individual characteristics did not appear to have grown from 1974 to 1984.
Krueger and Summers find the correlation of the estimated industry wage premiums
between 1974 and 1984 to be .970.These results indicate that the rising
dispersion in average industry wages since the early 1970's may largely reflect
changes in the composition of labor forces across industries and possibly also
changes in union wage impacts.
A further possibility is that industry wage differences arise from differences
in patterns of human capital accumulation across industries. Krueger and Summers
(1986) find that industry wage differentials are approximately equal in magnitude
and highly correlated for young (20 to 35 years old) and older (50 to 65 years
old) workers. Furthermore, the 1979 Current Population Survey contains informa-
tion on job tenure (years with current employer). I utilized this data set to
determine if industry wage differences vary with job tenure. Estimates of log
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 32earnings equations for separate tenure groups for nonunion, private sector workers
indicated that the industry differentials are quite similar for differenttenure
groups. For example, the standard deviation of one-digit industrywage differen-
tials for workers with less than one year of tenure and for workerswith greater
than 10 years of tenure are .11 and .12 respectively.25 The correlation(corrected
for sampling error) for the differentials of the two tenuregroups is .74. Large
industry wage effects are apparent for entry level workers that are close in size
and highly correlated with those of long—term employees.One exception is that
the differentials of all other industries versus retail tradeappear to be sub-
stantially larger for workers with long job tenure than for entry level workers.
4.1.3. The Occupational Structure of Industry Wage Premiums
Although most explanations for wage differentials provide reasons why one would
expect particular occupational groups to be high paid in some industries relative
to other industries, they do not lead one to expect thepattern of wage premiuns
to be the sane across industries for diverse occupationalgroups. For example,
a standard competitive model suggests that an industry with dangerousproduction
jobs may pay its blue collar workers high wages to compensate them for the risks
their jobs entail, but it does not also suggest that secretaries in thisindustry
should earn a pay premium. Working conditions, skillrequirements, and monitoring
problems are quite likely to differ across occupations in a firm or industry.
Dickens and Katz (1986) estimate industrywage differentials by occupation (for
a 12 occupation and three digit Census of Population industry breakdown) for
nonunion, private sector workers from the combined 1983 CPS sample. The effects
of human capital variables, demographic characteristics, and locationalvariables
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 33were constrained to be the same across occupational groups. Industry wageeffects
were allowed to vary by occupation. This involves the estimation of an earnings
function of the following form:
(4) Wj =X..+a. +
where is log(hourly wage) of individual i in industry—occupation cell j,
isa vector of individual and locational variables for individual i,is a vector
of parameters, aisa fixed effect (or differential) for industry—occupation cell
j, and a.. is an error term. This equation is equivalent to a wage equation with
industry dummies, occupation dummies, and a full set of interaction terms between
the industry and occupation dummies. The large number of industry—occupational
cells implies that the feasible approach to estirnatin the industry differentials
for each occupation is to first run a de—meaned regression in which the
industry—occupation cell means are subtracted off for the dependent variable and
all the independent variables:
(5) =(X-X)
+u.
where W is the mean of the log of hourly earnings for workers in cell 3, is
the the vector of the means of the individual and locational variables for workers
in cell 3, and u3 is a regression error. This regression, assuming that the
in equation (4) are uncorrelated with the yields a consistent estimate
of .Themean residual for each cell 3 is then a consistent estimate of the
industry—occupation 3 fixed effect:
(6) j =ij
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 34The estimated fixed effects were then grouped byoccupation to analyze the re-
lationships among industry impacts on wages in different occupations
Correlations of these estinated industrywage differentials across occupations
are presented in Table 3. The correlations are corrected for sampling error26
Table 3 indicates that even after controlling for a widevariety of individual
and geographic variables there are quite large correlations (mostin the range
.7 to 1) between average wages for workers inany two occupations within an in-
dustry. If one occupational group in an industry is high paid, allcategories of
workers tend to be high paid. This finding is tough to reconcile withviews that
the industry wage differences reflect unobserved abilityor compensating differ-
entials since skill requirements and working conditions are unlikely to becommon
to all occupations in an industry.
The results seem supportive of the union threat model sinceproduct market power
or profitability is likely to raise worker bargaining power acrossoccupations
in an industry. Furthermore, the occupational structure ofindustry wage effects
is quite similar for union and nonunion workers (Dickens andKatz, 1986). The
union threat model does not explain why groups of workers that do notpose a threat
of collective action (e.g. managers) also share in the industrypay premiums.
The high correlation in industry differentialsamong different occupations is
consistent with sociological models in whichwage norms are linked in a firm or
industry. The great efforts taken by firms to maintain their internalwage
structure is quite consistent with these findings.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 4.1.4. Industry Characteristics and Industry Wage Patterns
An understanding of the empirical relevance of alternative theoriesof wage de-
termination requires knowledge of the industry characteristics associatedwith
high wages amd with low wages after controlling for worker characteristics. A
considerable amount of empirical research has focused on therelationship between
wages and industry structure. These studies (partially surveyed by Long and Link
(1983) and Kwoka (1983)) have focused on the influences of product marketpower,
firm (or plant) size, and extent of unionization onwages. The industry charac-
teristics that affect wage levels and the extent to which these variablesmatter
appear to be quite sensitive to the specification (e.g. other control variables
included) and to the particular sample analyzed (e.g. time period and use of only
manufacturing vs. wider variety of industries). This suggests the effects are
not uniform across industries and that multicollineari-ty isimportant for many
industry variables.Nevertheless, some patterns emerge from these previous
studies.
Industry wage levels are strongly positively correlated with industryconcen-
tration when no labor quality variables are utilized (Weiss, 1966).The re-
lationship is far more ambiguous when detailed labor quality controlsare
included. Pugel (1980) and Hodson and England (1985) findstrong positive effects
of industry profitability measures onaverage industry wages even with controls
for average worker characteristics, extent of unionization, and otherindustry
variables including the rate of employment growth. Dickens and Katz(1986) find
that prpfits as a percentage of sales are strongly positively related toindustry
wage premiums for nonumion workers. Kwoka (1983), Long and Link (1983) and Mellow
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 36(1982) find a positive and significant effect of industry concentration on wages
utilizing individual level data on earnings and worker characteristics combined
with other industry level variables. This contrasts with Weiss's (1966) finding
that concentration does not matter once individual worker controls are taken into
account.Overall, industry wage differences appear to be related to product
market power (ability—to—pay) although measurement problems in variables such as
concentration and accounting profits mean these conclusions should be be viewed
as somewhat tentative.
Proportion of workers in an industry in large plants or average establishment size
have typically been found to be positively related to industry wage levels even
in the presence of detailed control variables (Kwoka, 1983; Long and Link, 1983;
Pugel ,1980and many others). Although establishment size and firm size appear
to have quite important effects on wages within industries, they cannot explain
much of inter—industry wage differentials. The May 1979 CPS contains a special
survey including questions on establishment and firms size. Krueger and Summers
(1986) find in analyzing this data set that the inclusion of plant size and firm
size controls barely affects the estimates of industry wage differentials. They
find the employment weighted standard deviation of two—digit industry log wage
differentials falls only from .104 to .99 when plant and firm size controls are
added to a log earnings equation with controls for occupation, region, union
status and individual characteristics. The raw correlation of the estimated in-
dustry differentials with and without employer size controls is .96.In re-
gressions (not reported here but available upon request) utilizing the 1979 CPS,
I find that estimated industry differentials are on slightly affected by the
inclusion of plant size and firms size dummies when nonunion workers are analyzed
in isolation.These results correspond to the conclusion of Brown and Medoff
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 37(1985) that most of the employer size effect on wages occurs within detailed in-
dustries.
Percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining in an industry has a strong
positive effect on average industry wages.27 Dickens and Katz (1986) find that
extent of industry unionization has a strong positive effect on both union and
nonunion wages. They also find that regional union density has a strong positive
effect on nonunion wages and a much weaker impact on union wages. Dickens (1986)
argues that this is the pattern of union density impacts that arises from an im-
portant role of a union threat in wage determination.
The impacts of industry variables on wages remain a bit of puzzle. The findings
of most studies are fairly consistent with some role for union threat effects
since product market power and extent of unionization seem to explain a fair
portion of inter—industry wage differentials for nonunion workers. Sociological
models of the Akcerlof (1984) variety also seem to have some support. The findings
of Hodson and England (1985) and Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) that capital in-
tensity (capital to labor ratio) has a positive effect on industry wages provides
some support for the shirking model since the cost of worker malfeasance is likely
to be greaterincapitalintensiveindustries.Capital—skilledlabor
complementarity suggests that the capital—labor ratio finding may simply proxy
for unmeasured labor quality. The strong linkages of wages to product market
variables even after controlling for a large nunber of individual and locational
variables appear difficult to reconcile with a strict unobserved ability inter-
pretation of industry wage differentials.
4.1.5. Direct Evidence on the Benefits to Firms of High Wages
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 38Efficiency wage models postulate that firms pay wages above the market clearing
level because there are cost reducing or productivity enhancing reasons to do so.
Some limited empirical evidence exists on the benefits to firms of higher wages.
As I noted previously, wage premiums are associated with lower quit rates. Thus,
high wages help to economize on turnover costs.The direct cost savings from
lower turnover do not appear to be large enough to justify the magnitude of ob-
served wage differentials. For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984, p. 109) estimate
that the cost savings associated with lower quit rates from the presence of a
union is 1 to 2 percent of labor costs. They also find that the impact of unionism
on quit rates to be equivalent to the impact of a 40 percent wage differential
The indirect gains of enhanced teamwork from continuity in work relationships may
be the more important element of the benefits of lower turnover.
Hammermesh (1977) finds that the deviation of a worker's wage from the wage pre-
dicted by the worker's personal and job characteristics is positively correlated
with various measures of job satisfaction. High wages appear to raise morale as
suggested by the sociological models and many personnel professionals. A further
unanswered question is whether job satisfaction measures have much to do with
productivity.Freeman and Medoff (1984) conclude from surveying a large number
of studies on worker attitudes and unionization drives that worker dissatisfaction
is strongly correlated with increased desire for unionization as expressed by
greater union organizing activity and a higher likelihood of votes in favor of
unionization in representation elections.High wages by raising worker satis-
faction reduce the likelihood of union organization as predicted by the union
threat model
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 39Krueger and Summers (1985) provide some further evidence linking wage premiums
to worker behaviors consistent with some of the supposed benefits to a firm of
efficiency wage payments. Industry wage premiums are found to be negatively re-
lated to absenteeism (due to weather) and positively related to employee self—
evaluations of work effort. The positive correlation of wage differentials and
employee views of work effort may simply indicate that high wages are acting as
a compensating differential for greater effort required on the job or a fast pace
of work. Allen (1984) finds consistently in an analysis of several data sets that
positive wage differentials are associated with reduced absenteeism. Although
absenteeism is something that can easily be observed by a firm, the reasons for
absenteeism are not easily monitored. High wages combined with the threat of job
loss for too much absenteeism might be am effective personnel policy.
Bulow and Summers (1986) discuss the introduction of the five dollar a day pay
system at Ford in 1914. They note that historical observers found that the higher
wages led to large increases in productivity and reductions in absenteeism and
turnover. This case provides some support for the implications of the shirking
and turnover model
Industry wage differences not captured by observed worker characteristics, work-
ing conditions variables, and locational variables are large and persistent.
These differentials are not well explained by compensating differentials or
transitory rents arising from shifts in labor demand across sectors. More work
utilizing longitudinal data is required to determine the extent to which unmeas-
ured ability may account for the estimated differentials. The union threat model
appears quite consistent with industry differentials for nonunion production
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 40workers.The long—term stability of industry wage differences through periods
with substantial differences in the extent of union organization indicate only a
more limited role for union threats and direct union impacts.Large wage dif-
ferentials across industries for occupations with little threat of collective
action suggests other factors must also be important. Industry differentials are
strongly correlated across occupational groups.Sociological models in which
industry wage contours or wage norms gain normative significance appear consistent
with these similarities in the industry wage patterns across occupations.Eco-
nomic efficiency wage rationales arising from monitoring, selection, and/or
turnover problems can provide reasons why certain jobs in an industry require wage
premiums. The concerns of firms with the perceived fairness of their internal
wage structure may mean that these differentials come to permeate the entire wage
structure in the industry. A combination of the economic efficiency wage models
with the sociological (normative) efficiency wage models provides a fairly con-
sistent though far from elegant account of the observed pattern of wage differ-
entials. Much more empirical work is needed trying to uncover direct evidence
of the gains to firms of high wage policies. Better measures of the factors that
economic efficiency wage models indicate should be important for wage differences
(e.g. monitoring costs) are required to better determine the relevance of these
models for understanding the apparent large impact of industry and firm affil-
iation on earnings.
4.2 Labor Market Discrimination28
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 41Efficiency wage models provide several reasons for persistent discrimination by
race and sex in a competitive labor market. Group differences unrelated to pro-
ductivity can potentiaJly generate wage differences and occupational segregation.
If two identifiable labor market groups differ in their rates of turnover or labor
force withdrawal, the group with the higher turnover propensity will have a
shorter horizon on a job and is likely to require greater inducement not to shirk.
Bulow and Summers (1986) show that in the dual labor market version of the
shirking model that the higher turnover group must be overrepresented in the
secondary sector since if the wage is the same for both groups in the primary
sector, the shorter horizon group is more likely to shirk unless the chances of
being able to get a primary job in the future are lower than for the long horizon
group.Since Poterba and Summers (1984) estimate a much higher rate of labor
force withdrawal for women aged 25 to 59 than for men in the same age group, this
yields a prediction of occupational and industrial segregation by sex with women
tending to be found in lower paying jobs that are easier to monitor. Bulow and
Summers (1986) demonstrate that if labor market discrimination arises from a re-
sult of differences in separation probabilities by groups, that anti—
discrimination policies such as affirmative action can raise welfare under a
utilitarian welfare criterion.
Johnson and Solon (1984) estimate that the earnings of both males and females are
negatively related to the proportion of females in their occupation even when a
wide variety of individual control variables are included. Additionally, Johnson
and Solon that most of the difference in male and female earnings after control-
ling for differences in individual characteristics is related to differences in
the industrial distribution of employment by sex. If industry wage differentials
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 42arise form efficiency wage considerations, then this is strong evidence that these
factors play a major role in differences in earnings by sex.
Goldin (1986) presents evidence on widespread sex segregation across jobs within
manufacturing requiring similar training and ability in 1890. She also finds that
50 percent of female operatives were paid by piece rates as opposed to 13 percent
of male operatives. Monitoring costs are found to be cheaper for piece rates than
for time rates in female dominated industries, while the opposite for male domi-
nated industries. Goldin argues that deferred payment systems, such as discussed
in Lazear (1979, 1981), conserved on monitoring costs and were feasible for males
but not for females because of their shorter work horizons. Females were confined
to jobs utilizing more expensive piece rates and thereby received lower wages than
males. The same argument would apply to the use of efficiency wages rather than
deferred payments for male dominated jobs if full bonding were not feasible.
Goldin also presents evidence showing that the feminization of the clerical oc-
cupations occurred only with standardization and division of tasks that made
monitoring easier.
-
Occupationaland industrial segregation arises in the shirking model because of
the inability of high turnover groups to post performance bonds. This suggests
that groups facing capital market imperfections are more likely to be affected.
Furthermore, even if groups don't differ in turnover propensities, if dtsadvan—
taged groups are liquidity constrained and unable to post bonds (accept deferred
payment schemes), they will be less able to get primary sector jobs. Dickens and
Lang (1985a,b) find that nonwhites are overrepresented relative to their observed
characteristics in secondary sector jobs.
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demand. If workers differ in unobservables and more productive workers have better
outside opportunities, wage cuts and worksharing reducing the value of the job
mean that the better workers are the one's most likely to leave for alternative
jobs or self—employment.
5. Cyclical Fluctuations and Efficiency Wages
Efficiency wage models provide several mechanisms through which cyclical fluctu-
ations in output can he generated by aggregate demand shocks. In the first place,
a basic property of these models is that wages are set by firms to maximize profits
as the interior solution to a maximization problem.30 In this case, the failure
of firms to adjust wages to small shocks leads to only second—order losses. This
differs sharply from a competitive labor market model where firms face large
losses fron failing to pay the competitive wage.Akerlof and Yellen (1985b)
demonstrate that if firms are efficiency—wage setters in the labor market and
monopolistic competitors in the product market then inertial wage and price be-
havior in response to small nominal shocks leads to only second—order losses to
the firms which follow such behavior even though this behavior generates a
macroeconomic response with first—order welfare consequences.3' Imperfect compe-
tition in the product market combined with efficiency wages in the labor market
potentially can yield a model of cylclical fluctuations in response to aggregate
demand disturbances.
a.
Strongincentives for the creation of of long—term firm—worker relationships arise
from efficiency wage considerations. The emergence of long—term employment re—
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 46lationships means that wage payments may reflect installment payments on long—term
obligations (Hall, 1980). In this case, employment decisions are not completely
guided by current wages.This may reduce the importance of sticky wages from
near—rationality and menu costs as a potential rationale for real impacts of
nominal shocks.
The importance of relative wage concerns in efficiency wage settings provides a
further rationale for inertial wage policies in response to real and nominal
shocks. This point has been illustrated for the turnover model by Stiglitz (1984,
1985). A drop in the money supply requiring a reduction in nominalwages to
maintain the existing level of unemployment may lead to unchanged nominalwages
with decentralized wage setting. Any individual firm reducing its wage will tend
to experience a higher quit rate and lower profits. Frictions in wage setting,
such as staggered contracts, can exacerbate the difficulties in adjusting to
nominal shocks when relative wages matter to firms and workers (Taylor, 1982).
If wages at all firms could be adjusted to shocks in a coordinated manner,! these
difficulties would not arise.
Monetary policy can also affect real output and the unemployment rate in the
shirking model if it can affect real interest rates (Bulow and Summers, 1986).
An increase in the real interest rate reduces the discounted value of keeping a
primary sector job and thereby increases the incentive of workers to shirk. This
can reduce employment by requiring higher wages to prevent shirking. The quan-
titative importance of this mechanism for monetary policy is likely to be quite
circumscribed.
6. Conclusions
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wages above the market clearing level since such wage premiums can help reduce
turnover, prevent worker malfeasance and collective action, attract higher qual-
ity employees, and facilitate the elicitation of effort by creating feelings of
equitable treatment among employees.Simple versions of efficiency wage models
can explain involuntary unemployment, segmented labor markets with queues for
primary sector jobs, and large differences among firms in the wages paid for what
appear to be similar workers. Suitably modified these models can parsimoniously
explain many of the major stylized facts concerning the behavior of labor markets
over the business cycle.
The primary criticism of efficiency wage models is that bonding mechanisms can
solve effort elicitation, turnover, and adverse selection problems in an efficient
manner. Additionally, the primary rationales for the use of efficiency wages also
are all arguments for the emergence of long—term contracts and long—term
employer—employee attachments. Such long—term relationships appear quite inipor—
tant in the primary sector of the labor market where efficiency wage consider-
ations are typically viewed as most important. These long—term attachments help
facilitate bonding through the use of deferred payment mechanisms. It is an open
empirical question whether seniority wage systems and pensions provide full
bonding or whether they are only partial solutions leaving room for efficiency
wages. Future theoretical work is required attempting to analyze efficiency wage
problems in an explicitly contractual setting.32 The reasons why the contract
market fails to clear need to be more fully explicated. The presence of more than
one efficiency wage consideration may mean that bonding mechanisms solving one
Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation 48efficiency wage problem exacerbate others. For example, Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1985) argue that employment fees to clear the market in presence of the shirking
problem may exacerbate adverse selection problems.Complicated contracts re-
quired to perform implicit bonding functions may create misunderstandings and lead
to feelings of inequity which harm morale and productivity.
Evidence on industry wage differences indicates that large differentials remain
that are quite difficult to explain in terms of differences in labor qualityor
differences in important nonpecuniary aspects of work requiring compensating
differentials. The persistence of industry wage premiums for long time periods
implies that they are not just transitory differentials arising to facilitate the
sectoral reallocation of labor in a dynamic market economy.Large, persistent
wage differentials for similar workers and types of jobs provide strong evidence
in favor of the importance of some type of efficiencywage behavior by many firms.
The complex pattern of differentials is difficult to reconcile with individual
variants of the efficiency wage argument. Further empirical research is required
to isolate the primary benefits to firms of high wages, the determinants of the
uses of alternative compensation systems (piece—rate vs. time rate etc.), and the
industry characteristics associated with large wage premiums.
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1. If efficiency wage considerations are equally important in all sectors of the
economy, involuntary unemployment, in the sense that similar workers are treated
differently with some being employed and others being unemployed and the unem-
ployed preferring to be employed, can arise. If efficiency wage problems are not
important in some sectors, jobs may always be available in these sectors. Jobs
in the efficiency wage sector will still be rationed and offer a positive utility
differential. Equivalent workers are treated differently even if there are always
some (typically lousy) jobs available. Unemployment may occur from workers
searching and waiting for the better rationed jobs.See Mookherjee (1984b) for
an interesting discussion of alternative concepts of involuntary unemployment.
2. Freeman and Medoff (1981) and Lewis (1982) provide detailed surveys of empir-
ical studies of union relative wage impacts
3. Foulkes (1980)




least partially as part of
(1984, chapter 10) provide
nonorganized labor in the
of large nonunion firms which main—
explicit union avoidance strategie￿.
a detailed discussion of the effects
United States.
4. See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1984), Rulow and Summers (1986), Jones
(1985), Stiglitz (1984), and Yellen (1984).
5. Stiglitz (1984) compares and contrasts the inplicit contract and the efficiency
wage theoretical literatures. Akerlof and Yellen (1984), Calvo (1979), and Yellen
(1984) present excellent surveys of work on efficiency wage models. This paper
differs from these earlier surveys in that it discusses new developments in the
literature, analyzes the similarities Of efficiency wage and union threat effect
models, and focuses more explicitly on empirical evidence that can help in de-
termining the consistency of the predictions of efficiency wage models with actual
labor market behavior.
6. Akerlof and Yellen (1984) provide economic interpretations of these conditions
required on the e(w) function for a sensible solution to the firm's maximization
problem
7. Solow (1979) shows that wage rigidi
wage enters the production function in a
run production function of the form Q =
giditywith respect to these types of shocks
8. Lazear (1983) and Penacavel (1977) analyze the major issues arising in the
choice of a piece—rate as opposed to a salary or time—rate compensation system.
is generally not efficient since firms fail to ade—
the impacts of their wage and monitoring levels on the
utilize to prevent shirking by employees (Shapiro and
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ty of this type only arises when the real
labor—augmenting way. A general short—






tely take into account
icies other firms must
glitz; 1984, 1985).10. Bulow and Summers (1986) analyze the impact of sectoral declines on wages and
employment in a standard shirking model. Lilien (1982) presents, evidence which
he interprets as indicating that sectoral shifts are the main contributor to cy-
clical unemployment fluctuations in the postwar United States. Abraham and Katz
(1986) show that his evidence is consistent with standard single factor (or
aggregate—demand— driven) business cycle models.Topel and Weiss (1985) argue
that increased sectoral uncertainty can explain the increase in the average (or
natural) rate of of unemployment in the United States since the mid—1970's.
Altonji and Ham (1985) survey recent empirical work on sectoral shifts and unem—
p1 oyment.
11. Bulow and Summers (1986) discuss the implications for industrial policy, trade
policy, and anti—discrimination policy of the non—competitive wage differentials
arising in this shirking model.
U. Dickens, Katz and Lang (1986) analyze these issues in far more detail.A
caveat to this argument is that firms may monitor workers for reasons other than
preventing shirking. Monitoring and supervision may be a way for firms to prevent
costly, but honest, mistakes by workers. Monitoring may also help firms sort
heterogeneous workers into tasks for which they are best suited.If firms some-
times make mistakes and fire workers who were not actually cheating (make type
II errors) and if workers are risk averse, the firm may find it optimal to expend
resources on monitoring to reduce the required bond and the compensating wage
differential needed to compensate workers for mistaken appropriations of their
bonds. This is really a variation on the theme that third party verification of
detected shirking is not possible.
B. Sect;i#t (I'jRi')
14.The standard rate wage policies favored by many unions provides an example.
Brown (1985) presents evidence on the prevalence and analyzes the implications
of such policies.
15. Pencavel (1977b) presents an interesting analysis of the causes and effects
of worker morale with an empirical application to British coal mining.
16. The "insider—outsider" theories of unemployment developed by Lindbeck and
Snower (1984) and Solow (1985) also generate job rationing outcomes from the
bargaining power of "insiders" (incumbent employees).
17. The data set utilized is described in detail in Dickens and Katz (1986). The
sample consists of private sector, nonagricultural employees, 16 years of age and
older. The sample combines information on the outgoing rotation groups from all
12 months of the 1983 CPS. Workers with wages less than $1 an hour and grater
than $250 an hour were treated as outliers and eliminated form the sample. The
results do not change qualitatively when these observations are left in the data
set.
18. In other words, the weights are the number of workers (observations) in an
industry in the sample.
19. This raw correlation is a downward biased estimate of the true correlation
since it is not corrected for the fact that the wage differentials are estimated
rather than known.
Footnotes 5120. These longitudinal results (industry switch effects) are potentially con-
sistent with models in which worker quality is heterogeneous (multidimensional)
and match quality varies. If match quality is not fully revealed at the start of
a match, one could generate systematic relations of industry switches and wage
changes of the type found by Krueger and Summers (1986). A matching model with
costly renegotiation and uncertain match quality, such as the model analyzed in
Antel (1985), also may be consistent with these results if the switches from high
to low wage industries are primarily layoffs or discharges and the moves from low
to high are primarily quits.
21. Rosen (1985a) provides a comprehensive treatment of the theory of equalizing
differences in the labor market and a review of empirical studies of compensating
differentials.
22. Krueger and Summers utilize a sample derived from the 1977 Quality of Em-
ployment Survey. The working conditions variables included are weekly hours,
variables indicating dangerous or unhealthy conditions on the job, commute time,
workshift dummies, dummies indicating extent of choice of overtime, and variables
indicating whether working conditions are pleasant.
23. This interpretation is clean if workers have homogenous tastes concerning
nonpecuniary aspects of work.If workers have heterogeneous preferences, then
it is possible to imagine distributions of worker preferences with respect to
nonwage aspects of work in which wage differentials that reflect compensating wage
differentials for marginal workers may be negatively correlated with average quit
rates in an industry. This means that quit rates do not depend on wage differences
for marginal workers but do for infra—marginal workers. A particular contrived
example is the case of one disamenity that some workers mind and others do not
mind. If enough workers care about the disamenity, a compensating differential
may arise to compensate the marginal worker for this disamenity. Workers who
don't care about the disamenity take jobs at the high wage firms with the disa—
menity and earn rents. These workers have lower quit rates and reduce the average
quit rate in high wage firms. Low wage firms without the disamenity have no
workers earning rents.In this example, more infra—marginal workers are at the
high wage firm and average quit rates are negatively correlated with wages. One
could also construct examples going in the other direction. Thus, if workers have
heterogeneous preferences, the relationship among quit rate and wage differen-
tials may be difficult to relate to the importance of equalizing differences in
the labor market.
24. Slichter utilizes data from the National Industrial Conference Board surveys
of establishments. The unskilled wage rate applies to jobs for which no previous
job training is required. Similar stability is apparent in the industry rankings
of the male skilled and semiskilled wage rate for this period. This may reflect
stability in skill differences given the heterogeneity of the category. Katz
(1986) provides a more detailed analysis of the stability and determinants of
inter—industry wage structure in the the pre—1950 period.
25. These are standard deviations of the estimated industry differentials from
separate regressions for each tenure group of log earnings on the same set of
control variables as those listed in Table 2 and one—digit industry dummy vari-
ables. The standard deviations listed are unbiased standard deviations corrected
for sampling error in the estimates of the industry dummy variable coefficients.
The sample is private sector, nonagricultural, nonunion workers, 16 and older from
Footnotes 52the May 1979 CPS. Workers without tenure data and with earnings less than $1 an
hour and greater than $250 an hour were deleted from the sample. The sample size
for the less than one year of tenure group is 2770 and for the 10 years or more
of tenure group it is 1912.
26. Dickens and Katz (1986) provide further details on the estimation technique
and describe the procedure for correcting the correlation coefficients for sam-
pling error. Since the industry differentials are estimated and since some of
the industry—occupation cells are small, sampling error can be an important
problem leading to an upward bias in the standard deviations of industry wage
effects within an occupation and a downward bias in the correlations of industry
premiums across occupations. The raw correlations (uncorrected for sampling er-
ror) of the industry wage differentials across occupations lead to similar results
with all of them quite positive.
27. Lewis (1983) provides a comprehensive survey of estimates of extent of
unionization on wages in industry level studies.
28. This section is intended as a brief discussion of some of the implications
of efficiency wage models for the analysis of labor market discrimination. I make
no attempt to survey the vast empirical and theoretical literature on discrimi-
nation in the labor market. See Cain (1984) for an excellent survey of the dis-
crimination literature.
29. Okun (1973) discusses in detail empirical regularities observed in the cy-
clical behavior of labor markets. Bernanke and Powell (1984) empirically analyze
the differences in similarities in the cyclical behavior of industrial labor
markets in the pre—war and post—war United States.
30. This follows directly from the structure of the model presented in Section
II. Stiglitz (1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b) develop this point in
detail.
31. Adjustment costs may be greater for output and employment than for prices and
wages. The menu costs or "near—rationality" argument appears equally consistent
with inertial output and employment policies with fluctuating wages and prices
in response to small shocks.
32. Mookherjee (19Mb) and Bester (1985) provide some interesting initial attempts
at linking efficiency wage and implicit contract theories. Stiglitz (1984) dis-
cusses future directions for research in this area.
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